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Li, Guanyi Ben (Ph.D., Economics)
Sourcing, Technology Transfer, and International Trade
Thesis directed by Prof. Wolfgang Keller
Relative to the multinational headquarters in the US and Western Europe, the
massive number of producers that these countries employ abroad have received rela-
tively little attention in the literature. My research adds to this body of knowledge by
specifically studying (1) who those producers are and (2) what technologies they use.
To address question (1), the first chapter develops a theory where the choice be-
tween cross-border partnership and within-border partnership depends on the size of
the gain through technology transfer from developed-country headquarters, and the
second chapter provides empirical evidence. When developing-country producers have
heterogeneous productivity, those with medium levels of productivity will gain suffi-
ciently from technology transfer and choose cross-border partnership. In contrast, high-
and low-productivity producers will work with their local headquarters, and the low-
productivity producers will not be able to sell their products to developed countries at
all.
The third chapter addresses question (2) by comparing the productivity of produc-
tion factors in Chinese electronics producers that are integrated with headquarters from
different source countries. It finds that the productivity of skilled labor is higher in those
with developed-country headquarters than those with emerging-economy headquarters,
while the productivity of unskilled labor shows no such difference.
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Chapter 1
The Choice of Partner: Theory
1.1 Introduction
Consumers in developed countries increasingly rely on goods that are produced
abroad. For example, the United States, where television was invented and is watched
more than in any other country, currently has no televisions produced domestically. It
is apparent that every aspect of a developed economy such as the US involves products
“Made in Country X” (where X refers to developing countries such as China, India, or
Mexico). Much less well understood is what types of firms in foreign countries are pro-
ducing for developed countries, namely, “Made by whom in Country X.” In particular,
information on the productivity of foreign producers is important, because their produc-
tivity determines how efficiently developed countries are served.
The first chapter of my dissertation analyzes the productivity of foreign firms that
serve developed countries. First, I develop a theory that characterizes how producers in
a foreign country (such as China) interact with headquarters in a home country (such
as the US). A foreign producer faces a trade-off between the productivity gain generated
by the home headquarter’s technology transfer and the coordination costs resulting from
cross-border differences in machinery specifications, regulations, management routines,
2and cultures. As an alternative to this cross-border partnership, the foreign producer
also has the option of partnering with its local headquarter. From the foreign producer’s
perspective, the advantage of cross-border partnership over within-border partnership
decreases if the foreign producer has a higher level of initial productivity.
The model shows that foreign producers (such as those in China) with mid-range
initial productivity are the firms that engage in cross-border partnership. At mid-range
level of productivity, the gains from technology transfer outweigh the frictions involved
in cross-border coordination, such that cross-border partnership generates sufficient
profits for both home headquarters and foreign producers. Unlike these mid-range pro-
ducers, foreign producers with high levels of initial productivity cannot garner sufficient
profits for themselves from technology transfer. Likewise, foreign producers with low
productivity cannot generate sufficient profits for home headquarters and thus are not
selected for cross-border partnership. As a result, foreign producers with either high or
low productivity engage in within-border partnership.
The model also shows that foreign producers with high initial productivity serve
both their local market (such as China) and the market of the developed-country head-
quarter (such as the US), while those with low productivity serve only their local market
because they cannot afford the fixed cost of exporting;1 moreover, among foreign produc-
ers that undertake cross-border partnership, those with relatively high productivity are
vertically integrated with their headquarters, while those with relatively low productiv-
1 The relationship between producer and headquarter in the model is vertical; see e.g., Hanson, Mataloni,
and Slaughter (2005), and Hummels, Ishii, and Yi (2001) for discussions on vertical fragmentation of produc-
tion. In this arrangement, cross-border production primarily serves the headquarter’s local market (such as
the US). In an extension of the model, I show the same findings when cross-border partnership serves other
markets as well.
3ity operate at arm’s length with their headquarters. This follows because, compared to
arm’s length, vertical integration has the advantage of more effective technology trans-
fer and easier coordination despite higher fixed costs.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the contribu-
tions of my study to the literature. Section 1.3 presents the model and discusses its four
predictions (Propositions 1–4). Section 1.4 checks the robustness of the model. After a
brief introduction (Section 2.1), Chapter 2 first describes the dataset (Section 2.2), then
tests the four predictions (Sections 2.3–2.6), and finally concludes Chapters 1–2 (Section
2.7).
1.2 Literature
This section discusses how Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 link to the literature. First of
all, my study belongs to the family of research on multinational practice in international
trade. Multinational practice was not considered in the literature until the 1980s by the
pioneer works of Helpman (1984) and Markusen (1984). Helpman (1984) and Markusen
(1984) examine vertical and horizontal multinational operations, respectively. The ver-
tical case usually results from factor-price differences across countries (e.g., between
developed and developing countries), and the horizontal case is common among devel-
oped countries where multinational headquarters use foreign subsidiaries to undertake
both production and distribution. These two studies became the benchmark approaches
in the literature (see, e.g., Helpman and Krugman (1985), Horstmann and Markusen
(1987), Brainard (1997), and Markusen and Venables (2000)).
In the past decade, productivity heterogeneity of firms is introduced into the in-
4ternational literature (e.g., Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum, 2003; Bustos, 2011;
Costantini and Melitz, 2008; Melitz, 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; and Yeaple,
2005), and the two benchmark approaches are extended accordingly. For instance, Antras
and Helpman (2004, 2008) in the vertical approach, and Chen, Horstmann, andMarkusen
(2008), Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004), and Yeaple (2009) in the horizontal ap-
proach. My study focuses on the vertical case, while it can be extended to account for
horizontal case as discussed later. Having made clear the big picture, I next move on to
how my study contributes to the literature in four sub-directions.
First, my study develops a framework that allows producers to endogenously choose
headquarters. This goes beyond the literature in which producers merely wait to be se-
lected and the selection is unilaterally made by headquarters. In my model, producers
and headquarters each select the other, so that cross-border partnership forms only if
the producer also finds this type of partnership to be more profitable than working with
its local partner.
Taking producers’ choices into account is important because the efficiency of multi-
national practice depends on which kind of foreign producers are employed. To date, it
remains unclear what level of productivity they have ex ante (before working with multi-
national headquarters) and ex post (after working with multinational headquarters).
My study finds that one fourth of the productivity premium of Chinese offshore produc-
ers relative to Chinese producers that do not export can be attributed to their difference
in initial productivity. Put differently, offshore producers turn out more productive than
non-offshore producers that do not export, not only because of the technology transfer
offshore producers ex post receive, but also because they are ex ante more productive.
5At this point, it is noteworthy that in my study a foreign producer is a production
facility that exists regardless of which partner to work with, a local headquarter or a
foreign one. This is easy to understand if the headquarter and producer stay at arm’s
length; namely, they undertake transactions with each other but remain standing alone.
But this study’s findings also carry over to the scenario in which the producer and the
headquarter are vertically integrated; that is, the producer becomes a subsidiary of the
headquarter if it chooses to work with the headquarter. The subsidiary remain exis-
tent even if not taken by a specific headquarter, because it can still be integrated by
another headquarter. This “independence” of subsidiaries from headquarters was first
introduced by Antras and Helpman (2004, 2008), based on the idea that producers can
be thought of as managers.
The second contribution is to provide insights on the frictions between produc-
ers and headquarters that exist in cross-border partnership. The transfer of technolo-
gies (or knowledge capital, as in Carr, Markusen, and Maskus (2003)) from headquar-
ters to producers is usually assumed to be frictionless in the literature. The transfer
could be frictional as argued by Arrow (1969), but the friction remains not well under-
stood, because such friction is largely conceptual and cannot directly be observed in the
data. Recent studies infer their existence from their presentations. There is evidence
that US multinational headquarters substitute for error-prone direct communications
with offshore producers by exporting intermediates that embody technologies (Keller
and Yeaple, 2010) and vertically integrate their foreign partners if the offshore tasks
are complicated (Costinot, Oldenski, and Rauch, 2011). This thesis complements these
studies by theoretically showing that developing-country producers with high productiv-
6ity do not choose to work with US multinational headquarters. Notably, if cross-border
partnership were frictionless, foreign producers with high productivity would always
find it profitable to partner with US multinational headquarters. This thesis empiri-
cally finds that Chinese producers with high productivity actually choose within-border
production, clearly attesting to the existence of frictions in cross-border partnership.
The third contribution is to assess the role of technology transfer in cross-border
mergers and acquisitions (M&A).2 In my model, headquarters in developed countries
(such as the US) prefer to partner with foreign producers with mid-range productivity
because the technology transfer from headquarters to producers translates into an ad-
vantage of the headquarters in contracting. They do not target foreign producers with
high productivity because, compared to those with mid-range or low productivity, pro-
ducers with high productivity have better alternative options and thus demand better
offers (i.e., profit shares). When partnering with producers with mid-range productivity,
headquarters do not need to offer much profit share, as technology transfer from the
headquarters makes their offers sufficiently attractive. This advantage in contracting
also exists if foreign producers have low productivity, but in that case developed-country
headquarters cannot garner enough profits and thus choose to work with their local
producers.3
Finally, this study is also closely linked to the studies on the effect of multina-
tional practices on the host country (e.g., Markusen and Venables, 1999; Rodriguez-
Clare, 1996). The literature has investigated two effects: first, host-country headquar-
2 For studies on cross-border M&A, see, e.g., Neary (2007), Nocke and Yeaple (2007), and Spearot (2010).
3 This model does not consider bi-sourcing, i.e., a home headquarter works with both a home producer and
a foreign producer; see Du, Lu, and Tao (2009).
7ters lose because their local producers turn to multinational headquarters (competition
effect), while host-country producers win because they have the freedom to choose bet-
ter headquarters (linkage effect). My study models how the two effects come into being
given that host-country producers have different productivity. I find that the competi-
tion effect exists so long as a host-country headquarter’s producer meets a productivity
threshold, but it dominates the linkage effect only when that producer has mid-range
productivity.
1.3 Model
1.3.1 Environment
Consider a world that consists of a host country (H) and a source country (S), which
correspond to the foreign country and the home country that were introduced before.4
Their residual demand functions for differentiated products are, respectively,
yH =ΦHp−1/(1−α)H ,
yS =ΦSp−1/(1−α)S ,
(1.1)
where pl is price, Φl measures the demand level, l ∈ {H,S}, and α is a parame-
ter that determines the demand elasticity 1/(1−α). Production of a differentiated good
involves two parties: a producer X and a headquarter Z. There are X and Z in both
countries: XH , XS, ZH , and ZS.
The host-country producer XH with initial productivity θ ∈R++ can partner with
4 This change in denomination is to save mental efforts for the author and readers. In technical writing,
the term home/foreign may be subconsciously interpreted in different meanings depending on one’s nationality
background. Unlike home/foreign, source/host is neutral with respect to the reference country.
8either a host-country headquarter ZH (partnership HH) using the production function
yHH = θxSS, (1.2)
or a source-country headquarter ZS (partnership HS) using the production function
yHS = g(γ,µ,θ)xHS, (1.3)
where xk, k ∈ {HH,HS}, is the input of production. In the rest of the chapter, these two
partnership types are also referred to as within-border and cross-border, respectively.
Under partnership types HH and HS, XH produces according to the design provided by
ZH and ZS, respectively.
In γ, µ, and θ of production function (1.3), only θ is a producer-level parameter. γ
denotes technology transfer from ZS and µ is an inverse measure of coordination diffi-
culty. The combination (γ,µ,θ) determines g, i.e., the final productivity of production.
Henceforth, θ and g are referred to as ex-ante and ex-post productivity, respectively.
Technology transfer γ and initial productivity θ are complementary in effect, while coor-
dination difficulties reduce both γ and θ. I use the functional form
g(γ,µ,θ)= (γθ)µ,µ ∈ (0,1) (1.4)
to characterize the fact that both parties’ contributions to g, namely γ and θ, are re-
duced because of coordination difficulties. If either γ or θ doubles, g increases less than
double.5
Tariff and cross-border transport costs are assumed to be zero at this point, but can
easily be incorporated as shown later. In country H, unit cost of the input x is c. Under
5 The functional form g(γ,µ,θ) = γµθ, which I use later for robustness check, leads to the same results. It
is not used here as the benchmark case because it requires constant productivity returns from γ and θ, which
contradicts empirical evidence (see Belderbos, Ito, and Wakasugi, 2008).
9partnership HH, the output may either serve country H only or both countries H and
S. In the latter case a fixed cost fEX (EX stands for “exporting”) must be paid to build
overseas marketing and sales networks. For convenience, these two cases are regarded
as two different partnership types, denoted by (HH,NON) and (HH,B), respectively.
Cross-border partnership HS is free from fEX because ZS knows its local market well.
In country S, unit cost of the input x is c˜. XS ’s only potential partner is ZS (if they
work together, the partnership type is referred to as SS), and the production function
thereof is6
ySS = θ˜xSS, (1.5)
where θ˜ is a constant, which can be rationalized by considering XH as the best available
producer in Country S.7 To summarize, ZS chooses between partnership types HS and
SS, while XH chooses between partnership types (HH,NON), (HH,B), and HS.
The joint profits under the four partnership types are8
piHH,NON(Θ)=ΨΦHΘ, (1.6)
piHS(Θ)=ΨΦSΓΘµ, (1.7)
piHH,B(Θ)=Ψ(ΦH +ΦS)Θ− fEX , (1.8)
piSS = Ψ˜ΦSΘ˜, (1.9)
6 I assume that developed-country headquarters are homogeneous. This removes from the analysis hetero-
geneity among internationally operating firms in developed countries, which is not crucial given my focus on
the trade-off between technology transfer gains and coordination costs that foreign firms face. According to
the literature, these headquarters are the most productive firms in developed countries; see, e.g., Antras and
Helpman (2004, 2008), and Grossman, Helpman, and Szeidl (2005, 2006).
7 In other words, cross-border partnership becomes an option when ZS has exhausted domestic options to
raise productivity.
8 See Appendix A for derivation.
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where Θ = θ α1−α , Θ˜ = θ˜ α1−α , Γ = γ αµ1−α , Ψ = (1−α)/( c
α
)α/(1−α), and Ψ˜ = (1−α)/( c˜
α
)α/(1−α). The
threshold of Θ for XH in within-border partnership to serve both countries can be solved
by equating RHH,NON to RHH,B: Θ∗ = fEX /(ΨΦS). piSS all goes to ZS if ZS chooses
partnership SS, because XS has no outside option. Since Ψ˜, ΦS, and Θ˜ are all constants,
p˜i≡piSS = Ψ˜ΦSΘ˜ is defined for convenience.
Γ = [γα/(1−α)]µ is technology transfer after factoring in coordination difficulties,
which determines whether cross-border partnership is feasible. If Γ is too low, cross-
border partnership becomes inferior to within-border partnership because technology
transfer is always outweighed by difficulties in cross-border coordination. Formally, Γ is
required to satisfy
Γ>
[(
Ψ˜
Ψ
)(
Θ˜
Θ∗
)
+
(
ΦH
ΦS
)]
Ω, (1.10)
where Ω ≡ (Θ∗)1−µ sets a reference level of technology transfer. The components in
the right-side bracket of condition (1.10) are the factors that affect the requirement on
technology transfer. This requirement on Γ becomes relaxed if Country S has a stronger
cost disadvantage (smaller Ψ˜), worse local producers (smaller Θ˜), or a wider local market
(larger ΦS). Remember that Country S is a developed (Northern) country. In a North-
South setting, ZS resorts to a Southern Country H for low input costs, the effect of
which is through Ψ˜/Ψ. In comparison, in a North-North setting, ZS resorts to another
Northern Country H for more productive producers, the effect of which is through Θ˜/Θ∗.
The timing of events is as follows. On date 1, ZH and ZS propose their respective
contracts to XH and XH accepts one of the two. The contracts specify who partner with
whom and how future revenue will be divided between them. ZH can only propose to XH ,
and has to exit if its proposal is rejected. ZS will partner with XS if either its proposal
11
is rejected by XH , or it does not want to partner with XH at all.9 The contracting
process is summarized in Figure 1. On date 2, production, sales, and revenue division
are carried out according to the contracts.
1.3.2 Equilibrium
The equilibrium characterizes how four parties, XH , XS, ZH , and ZS, choose their
partners given all possible values of Θ. As shown in Figure 1, XS does not have an
option other than ZS, so the analysis centers on what ZH and ZS offer XH in their
respective contracts and how XH chooses between them. XH chooses between ZH and
ZS depending on which one offers a larger profit transfer in its contract; meanwhile, the
offers by ZH and ZS depend on how each other responds.
Let piHH(Θ) be the maximum joint profit when XH and ZH become partners,
piHH(Θ)=max{piHH,NON(Θ),piHS(Θ)},
and piXHHH(Θ) be the portion in piHH(Θ) that goes to XH . The reservation profit for XH
to choose partnership HS is piXHHH(Θ), while that for ZS is p˜i. Thus, partnership HS is
chosen by XH and ZS if and only if10
piHS(Θ)−piXHHH(Θ)− p˜i> 0. (1.11)
I next investigate when condition (1.11) holds. p˜i is known, and piXHHH(Θ) is unknown
but its maximum is piHH(Θ). It is currently unclear whether pi
XH
HH(Θ) = piHH(Θ); thus, I
9 The latter case is equivalent to that ZS issues an invalid contract to XH .
10 The proof of this condition is straightforward. For “if,” given the condition satisfied, XH and ZS have their
reservation profits secured, and thus will accept any division of the extra profit piHS(Θ)−pi
XH
HH(Θ)−p˜i. For “only
if,” to profitably partner with XH , ZS must ensure XH of at least pi
XH
HH(Θ), leading to piHS(Θ)− p˜i>pi
XH
HH(Θ).
12
examine instead the condition
piHS(Θ)−piHH(Θ)− p˜i> 0, (1.12)
which is stricter than condition (1.11), and then prove:
Lemma 1 (i) piHS(Θ)−piHH(Θ)− p˜i = 0 has two solutions Θ and Θ: Θ < Θ∗ < Θ; (ii)
piHS(Θ)>piHH(Θ)+ p˜i if and only if Θ ∈ (Θ,Θ).
Lemma 1 presents two thresholds of Θ, Θ and Θ, and shows condition (1.12) to hold
given Θ ∈ (Θ,Θ).11 Its intuition is summarized in Panel (a) of Figure 2, which shows
the equilibrium joint-profit schedule from XH ’s perspective. Notably, p˜i, ZS ’s reservation
profit in cross-border partnership, is essentially a fixed cost from XH ’s perspective. Next,
I prove
Lemma 2 Conditions (1.11) and (1.12) are equivalent.
The intuition behind Lemma 2 is as follows. When Θ ∈ (Θ,Θ), ZH and ZS compete
to get XH , and ZS wins by offering a profit of piHH(Θ) to XH . ZS matches this offer by
keeping no profit for itself; however, by Lemma 1, ZH can always offer slightly more.
In equilibrium, partnership HS is formed, piZHHS(Θ)= 0, pi
XH
HS(Θ)= piHH(Θ), and pi
ZS
HS(Θ)=
piHS(Θ)−piHH(Θ). When Θ ∈ [Θ,∞), because of difficulties in cross-border coordination,
ZH can beat ZS by offering a profit of piHS(Θ)− p˜i to XH . Thus, partnership (HH,B) is
formed, piZHHS(Θ)=piHH,B(Θ)− (piHS(Θ)− p˜i), pi
XH
HS(Θ)=piHS(Θ)− p˜i, and pi
ZS
HS(Θ)= p˜i.
WhenΘ ∈ (0,Θ), the analysis is slightly complex. DefineΘ∗ such that piHS(Θ∗)−p˜i=
0. With a moderately low Θ ∈ (Θ∗,Θ], XH finds technology transfer from ZS attractive,
11 As a numerical example of Θ and Θ, let Ψ= Ψ˜= 1, ΦH = 1, ΦS = 1.2, Γ= 1.1, µ= 0.5, and p˜i= 0.3; then the
two solutions are Θ= 0.12 and Θ= 0.74.
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but its ex-post productivity is not high enough to earn XH as much profit from cross-
border partnership as from within-border partnership for the following reason. If XH
wants to keep ZS in the partnership, XH has to pay ZS the reservation profit p˜i. After
paying p˜i, XH earns less than in within-border partnership, because in the partnership
with ZH , XH has a stronger leverage, thanks to its alternative partner ZS. Thus, part-
nership (HH,NON) is formed, piZH (Θ)=piHH,NON(Θ)−(piHS(Θ)−p˜i), piXH (Θ)=piHS(Θ)−p˜i,
and piZS (Θ) = p˜i. When Θ ∈ (0,Θ∗], XH cannot afford p˜i anyway, so it has no option but
to partner with ZH , leading to partnership (HH,NON). In this partnership, XH has no
leverage such that piZHHH,NON(Θ)=piHH,NON(Θ), pi
XH
HH,NON(Θ)= 0, and pi
ZS
HH,NON(Θ)= p˜i.
The above discussion has analyzed both profit and partnership schedules for each
party. The profit schedules are graphically summarized by Panel (b) of Figure 2. The
areas [1], [2], and [3] are the surpluses obtained by ZS, XH , and ZH , respectively. The
partnership schedules are summarized by Proposition 1:
Proposition 1 In equilibrium, the partnership schedules are
Ex-ante Productivity Partnership Type
Θ≤Θ (HH,NON) SS
Θ<Θ<Θ HS HS
Θ≥Θ (HH,B) SS
Three issues are noteworthy here. First, the equilibrium results from interaction
between the four parties rather than any one party’s unilateral decision. Specifically, the
model is not simply XH sorting itself into one of the three different partnership types, as
XH makes decisions in response to the decisions of the other three parties. The model is
14
also not as simple as ZS selecting one partner between XH and XS, because ZS ’s choice
depends on how ZH behaves. It is difficult to say which party of the four is the most
active one, because the findings will change if any of the four parties deviates from the
equilibrium.
Second, intermediate trade can easily be added to the model. x is a combination of
production factors, including capital, labor and intermediates. Suppose that ZS finishes
the intermediates in Country S and ships them to XH . Then, the c under partnership
HS will change relative to c˜, which nevertheless does no more than change Ψ relative
to Ψ˜ and hence Θ and Θ. This also applies to the case in which ZS provides capital or
labor.
Third, transport cost and tariff are absent in the model, but including them does
not make a notable difference. For example, with an iceberg transport cost, both piHS
and piHH,B decline, the former of which declines by a larger magnitude than the latter,
because partnership (HH,B) exports only part of its output, but partnership HS exports
all of its output. Consequently, Θ rises and Θ declines, discouraging partnership HS
relative to partnerships (HH,NON), (HH,B), and SS. This does not change the above
findings. A tariff is similar to transport cost in reducing piHS more than piHH,B, such
that trade liberalization encourages partnership HS relative to other partnership types.
1.3.3 Average ex-ante productivity
Up to this point, the model has only four parties involved: XH , XS, ZH , and ZS.
In this four-party setting, XH has an exogenously determined productivity Θ and the
previous discussion focuses on how equilibrium partnership and profit schedules vary by
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Θ. Now I consider a world with multiple four-party sets with different Θ.12 Specifically,
Θ is now randomly drawn from a population with cumulative density function V (Θ),
and each Θ is associated with a four-party set. Let θ0 be the lower bound of ex-ante
productivity andΘ0 = θ
α
1−α
0 . Now each four-party set engages in the interaction discussed
above. The average ex-ante productivity in the three partnership types are defined as,
respectively,
Θ̂HH,NON ≡
1
V (Θ)−V (Θ0)
∫ Θ
Θ0
ΘdV (Θ), (1.13)
Θ̂HS ≡
1
V (Θ)−V (Θ)
∫ Θ
Θ
ΘdV (Θ), (1.14)
Θ̂HH,B ≡ 1
1−V (Θ)
∫ ∞
Θ
ΘdV (Θ). (1.15)
It then follows that there is a ranking of average ex-ante productivity among the three
partnership types:
Proposition 2 Θ̂HH,NON < Θ̂HS < Θ̂HH,B.
1.3.4 Introducing industrial and regional characteristics
The analysis in Section 1.3.3 can be extended by allowing additional parameters of
four-party sets to vary. Specifically, the four-party sets can be from different industries,
so the effectiveness of technology transfer (γ) varies between industries. In Country
H, the producers can be from regions with different qualities of infrastructures and
institutions, so the coordination difficulty µ varies between regions within Country H.13
12 The number of XH-ZH pairs and the number of XS-ZS pairs are implicitly assumed to be equal, so their
numbers are equal to the number of four-party sets. If the number of XH-ZH pairs is unequal to that of XS-ZS
pairs, the analysis will entail the interplay among market sizes, free-entry conditions, and entry costs of two
countries’ local markets. These issues are beyond the scope of this study.
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Note that in the previous discussion, both partnership types HS and (HH,B) involve
exporting (i.e., to serve Country S). Now I analyze how γ and µ affect the prevalence of
one partnership relative to the other in the collection of four-party sets. The shares of
the two partnerships that involve exporting, HS and (HH,B), are respectively
σHS =
V (Θ)−V (Θ)
1−V (Θ) , (1.16)
σHH,B = 1−V (Θ)1−V (Θ) . (1.17)
These two equations imply that more exporters will be under partnership HS relative to
partnership (HH,B) if (1) the technology transfer from ZS to XH becomes more effective
(γ increases), or (2) the coordination between ZS and XH becomes easier because of the
higher quality of infrastructures and institutions in the region where XH is located (µ
increases).
Next, I assume V (Θ) = 1− (Θ0/Θ)ζ, ζ > 0; i.e., Θ follows a Pareto distribution.14
Thus, σHS = 1−
(
Θ/Θ
)ζ
, σHH,B =
(
Θ/Θ
)ζ
. It follows that more exporters would be under
partnership HS relative to partnership (HH,B) if the dispersion of Θ becomes smaller
(ζ increases). To summarize,15 ,16
Proposition 3 Among exporters, cross-border partnership becomesmore prevalent than
13 Coordination can also be affected by industrial characteristics, which would not affect Proposition 3. The
reason is as follows. Let µ = µ+µin, where µ and µin are region- and industry-specific, respectively. Then,
g = (γθ)µ = (γθ)µ+µin = γµγµinθµ+µin , where γµ is industry-region specific and γµin is industry-specific. Parts
(i) and (ii) of Proposition 3 can be proved as before. Part (iii) of Proposition 3 does not involve γ or µ, so it is
unaffected.
14 For analyses of the Pareto distribution, see Axtell (2001) and Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004) for
empirical evidence, and Gabaix (2009) and Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007) for theoretical discussions.
15 σk′ is the share of exporters in partnership type k′ ∈ {HS, (HH,B)}. If the total number of four-party sets
is M, the number of type k′ exporters is σk′M. The number ratio of HS exporters to (HH,B) exporters is thus
σHSM/σHH,BM =σHS /σHH,B. See footnote 12 for the discussion on the number of four-party sets.
16 Note that only part (iii) of Proposition 3 relies on the assumption of a Pareto distribution. I will revisit
this assumption in the next chapter.
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within-border partnership, given more transferable technology, less productivity disper-
sion, or easier cross-border coordination. Formally, d( σHS
σHH,B
)/dγ> 0; (ii) d( σHS
σHH,B
)/dµ> 0;
(iii) d( σHS
σHH,B
)/dζ> 0.
Proposition 3 shows how relative prevalence of partnership types depends on industrial
and regional characteristics. Notably, under partnership types HS and (HH,B), the
products are both “Made in Country H;” but the product designs are from Country S
and Country H, respectively, as designs are provided by headquarters.
1.3.5 Organizational form
The previous discussion does not consider the organizational form of cross-border
partnership. Now I assume that ZS also specifies the organizational form m ∈ {O, I}
in its proposed contract, where I and O denote vertical integration and arm’s length,
respectively. Compared with arm’s length, vertical integration facilitates technology
transfer and coordination, but incurs a higher fixed cost: ΓI >ΓO, µI >µO, f I > fO = 0.17
Then, the model can be resolved and generates the following findings:
Proposition 4 Let Θm and Θm be the new productivity thresholds among partnership
types. Then, (i) ΘO = Θ < ΘI < ΘO = Θ < ΘI , (ii) the thresholds between partnership
types (HH,NON), HS, and (HH,B) are Θ and ΘI ; (iii) if joint profits satisfy
piHS,I(ΘI)>piHS,O(ΘI) (1.18)
piHS,I(Θ)<piHS,O(Θ),
there exists ΘI such that Θ<ΘI <ΘI and
17 Notably, the previous analysis in this chapter focuses the arm’s length case.
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(k,m)=

(HS,O) if Θ<Θ<ΘI
(HS, I) if ΘI ≤Θ<ΘI ;
(1.19)
(iv) Define
Θ̂HS,O ≡
1
V (ΘI)−V (Θ)
∫ ΘI
Θ
ΘdV (Θ), (1.20)
Θ̂HS,I ≡
1
V (ΘI)−V (ΘI)
∫ ΘI
ΘI
ΘdV (Θ); (1.21)
then,
Θ̂HS,O < Θ̂HS,I .
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is graphically illustrated by Figure 3. Notice
that conditions (1.18) are used to ensure ΘI ∈ (Θ,ΘI). Violating them does not alter the
analysis, but it removes one of the two organizational forms from the equilibrium.
1.4 Robustness: served market and functional form
This chapter focuses on how host-country producers with different levels of pro-
ductivity serve Country S in different partnership types. To sharpen the analysis, the
model has so far assumed cross-border partnership to serve only Country S. I now show
that the previous results hold if cross-border partnership instead serves both countries.
In that case, profit function in partnership HS becomes
piHS(Θ)=Ψ(ΦS+ΦH)ΓΘµ. (1.22)
Then the necessary condition (1.10) for the presence of cross-border partnership in equi-
librium becomes
Γ>
[
(1−∆)
(
Ψ˜
Ψ
)(
Θ˜
Θ∗
)
+∆
]
Ω. (1.23)
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where ∆=ΦH /(ΦH+ΦS), which is smaller than the ΦH /ΦS in condition (1.10), namely a
weak version of relative market size.
Returning to Figure 2, the only difference that this additional served market intro-
duces is a far rightward intersection between piHS and piHH,B. Propositions 1 and 2 still
hold, as the three sections in the productivity spectrum have the same relative location
as before. So do Propositions 3 and 4, as they are unrelated to the market(s) that cross-
border partnership serves. This analysis can be generalized by using additional markets
of irregular sizes for cross-border partnership. Unlike within-border partnership in the
host country, cross-border partnership can serve a third market, which is referred to as
export-platform FDI in the literature (Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen, 2007).18 This
third-market advantage results from the fact that ZS may have marketing and sales
channels that are unavailable to ZH . Its effect is technically the same as ∆ in condition
(1.23).
The case in which cross-border production serves two markets is useful for showing
how functional form affects the previous findings.19 I next show that using a different
functional form leads to the same result. The functional form in equation (1.4) neatly
presents the fact that γ is constrained by difficult cross-border coordination µ ∈ (0,1), but
γ can also be constrained by factors other than µ. For instance, γ can be constrained by
itself–ZS “has little to teach” if the producer is sufficiently productive–then γ reaches its
limit if θ is sufficiently high. Formally, dγ(θ)/dθ > 0,d2γ(θ)/dθ2 < 0, so γθ approaches θ
18 As discussed in Section 1.3.5, the headquarter and producer in cross-border production can also operate
at arm’s length in this study; this practice is export-platform subcontracting.
19 This discussion on alternative functional form also applies to the case in which cross-border partnership
serves only Country S (the benchmark model) or serves a third market (export-platform FDI/subcontracting).
The use of the two-market setting provides a clearer graphical presentation. As shown in Figure 4, the alter-
native functional form translates into a self-explanatory slope change.
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as θ rises.
Now, let cross-border partnership use the production function
yHS =µγ(θ)θxHS,µ ∈ (0,1), (1.24)
and within-border partnership in Country H uses production function (1.2) as before.
Define pi′HH,B as the profit from within-border partnership with cross-border coordina-
tion, which is a hypothetical case to facilitate the analysis. Formally, this hypothetical
within-border partnership employs
y′SS =µθx′SS. (1.25)
As shown in Figure 4, the productivity advantage of cross-border partnership attenuates
as Θ rises, so piHS eventually parallels pi′HH,B. As previously shown, XH with mid-range
Θ still chooses partnership HS, while high and low Θ lead to partnerships (HH,B) and
(HH,NON), respectively. Therefore, Propositions 1–4 can be similarly proved as before.
After showing theoretical robustness, I present the empirical evidence of Proposi-
tions 1–4 in the next chapter.
Chapter 2
The Choice of Partner: Empirical Evidence
2.1 Introduction
The findings in Chapter 1 are evaluated using firm-level data from China. China
is arguably the ideal case for examining cross-border partnership since it is by now the
largest exporting country in the world and the largest host country for foreign direct
investment in the developing world. The model generates three testable predictions. (1)
On average, Chinese producers that engage in within-border partnership (i.e., partner-
ing with a Chinese headquarter) and serve only China have low productivity, those in-
volved in cross-border partnership (i.e., partnering with an overseas headquarter) have
mid-range productivity, and those involved in within-border partnership and serving
both China and overseas markets have high productivity. (2) Among all exporters in
China, cross-border partnership is more prevalent than within-border partnership in the
industries with more transferable technology and less productivity dispersion. Cross-
border partnership is also more prevalent in the regions that have higher qualities of
infrastructures and institutions, because good infrastructures and institutions facilitate
cross-border coordination. Notably, my focus is the effect of infrastructures and insti-
tutions on the composition of exporters, while the existing literature emphasizes the
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effect on aggregated trade flows. See Bougheas, Demetriades, and Morgenroth (1999),
Levchenko (2007), Nunn (2007), and Nunn and Trefler (2008). (3) Among Chinese pro-
ducers in cross-border partnership, those with relatively high productivity are vertically
integrated with their headquarters, while those with relatively low productivity operate
at arm’s length with their headquarters.
The first prediction finds strong support from a simple regression of firm produc-
tivity on partnership types. A number of factors are considered that could potentially
confound the result. The first is local tax policies of China–as those of other developing
countries–favor cross-border over within-border partnership. I examine both ad-valorem
as well as lump-sum tax favors, showing that my results are robust to incorporating tax-
ation effects into the analysis (see Section 3.2). The second is causes other than initial
productivity. The model centers on initial productivity, but the estimated productivity
differences may also result from technology transfer as well as heterogeneity in products
and headquarters across partnership types.
To isolate the effect of producers’ initial productivity, I examine the firms that
undertook within-border partnership and sold their products only in China, but later
switched to either cross-border partnership or within-border partnership serving both
China and abroad. The results show that before switching the producers that eventu-
ally switched to within-border partnership serving both Chinese and overseas markets
had high productivity, those that ultimately switched to cross-border partnership had
mid-range productivity, and those that never switched at all had low productivity. These
results directly support the idea that initial productivity determines the interaction be-
tween headquarters and producers.
23
I go on to test the second and third predictions of the model, investigating the
impact of industrial and regional characteristics on relative prevalence of different part-
nership types in exporters, as well as the effect of productivity on the organizational
form that is chosen. The empirical findings are in line with the predictions. In particu-
lar, among firms undertaking cross-border partnership, those that switched from arm’s
length to vertical integration were more productive before switching than those that
remained at arm’s length, again attesting to the effect of initial productivity.
2.2 Data
The primary data source for my empirical work is the Annual Surveys of Indus-
trial Production (ASIP) from 2000 through 2003 conducted by the National Bureau of
Statistics of China. A number of papers have recently used this data for other purposes,
including Hsieh and Klenow (2009), Lu, Lu, and Tao (2009), Park, Yang, Shi, and Jiang
(2009), and Qian (2008). These annual surveys collected detailed information on firms
that were either state- or non-state owned with annual sales of 5,000,000 Yuan or more,
including sales revenue, exported value, capital, employment, and wage. The industry
section of China Statistical Yearbooks was compiled using these surveys. In the cov-
ered years, the exchange rate was approximately $1=8.27 Yuan. So 5,000,000 Yuan were
equivalent to about $600,000.
Firm-level information on ownership (domestic or overseas) and sales destination
(domestic or overseas) reported by the ASIP, as summarized in Table 1, is used to identify
the partnership types and organizational forms specified in the theoretical model. Recall
that there are three partnership types for host-country producers: (HH,NON), HS,
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and (HH,B). The two partnership types of within-border partnership, (HH,NON) and
(HH,B), correspond to domestically owned firms that serve only the Chinese market and
both Chinese and overseas markets, respectively. The partnership type of cross-border
partnership, HS, refers to the firms that serve only the overseas market; they can be
either domestically owned or foreign-owned,1 depending on their organizational form:
arm’s length (HS,O) or vertical integration (HS, I).
Table 2 reports the share of each partnership type in total value of exports and
total number of exporters during the years 2000-2003. Cross-border partnership, or HS,
accounts for roughly 40% in total exported value and 35% in total number of exporters.
Under partnership HS, the ratio between ownerships (domestic to overseas) is about
2:3.
2.3 Relative productivity
Propositions 2–4 are directly testable and I start with Proposition 2. I first specify
a simple regression
lnTFPd jrt =ω+κ′TYPEd+ ι′Cdrt+ν j+νt+²d jrt, (2.1)
and include in the sample only those firms with invariant partnership types over time.
This specification is convenient in estimating productivity differences among partner-
ship types.2 The dependent variable is total factor productivity (TFP) calculated using
Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) estimates. TFP is the output not explained by inputs used in
1 According to The Law of the People’s Republic of China on Foreign-funded Enterprises, overseas-
owned firms refer to “those enterprises established in China by foreign investors, exclusively with their own
capital, in accordance with relevant Chinese laws.”
2 Regressions in the other way around (i.e., partnership types on TFP) are reported in Appendix B and show
the same results.
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production. Its value relies on the estimated coefficients of inputs in the production func-
tion. OLS estimates of the input coefficients are potentially biased by unobservables. To
address the bias, the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method uses intermediate inputs to
proxy for the unobservables.
Indices d, j, r, and t represent firm, industry, region, and year, respectively. TYPEd
is a vector of dummy variables that indicates firm d’s partnership type. Firms under
(HH,NON) serve as the reference group. TYPEd = [HSd,HHBd]′, HHBd = 1 if the
firm is under (HH,B), HSd = 1 if the firm is under either (HS,O) or (HS, I), and κHS
and κHHB are their respective coefficients. Cdrt is a set of firm/region characteristics in
year t. An industry is defined by a four-digit industry code. ν j and νt are industry and
year fixed effects, respectively. ²d jrt is a classic error term.
Table 3 shows κ̂HHB > κ̂HS > 0, supporting the prediction of Proposition 2. The
difference between κ̂HS and κ̂HHB is statistically significant at 1% level in all columns.
Column (1) is the baseline regression without control variables. Column (2) is similar to
(1) but controls for profit margin, capital intensity, and regional population. The profit
margin, defined as pre-tax profit over sales in the literature (Phillips, 1995), purges
possible market power from the estimated productivity; capital intensity and regional
population as control variables reduce noises caused by industry composition and local
market size.3 Columns (1)–(2) have included fixed effects, while column (3) includes
random effects.
Next I discuss whether various confounding factors influence these results. First, I
examine whether the results are affected by taxation effects. Developing countries such
3 As in Antras (2003), capital intensity is measured using the ratio of capital stock to total employment.
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as China usually have local tax policies that favor cross-border partnership. I consider
ad-valorem and lump-sum tax favors, respectively, which affect the empirical results in
different ways. Ad-valorem tax favors provide producers with the highest productivity
the incentives to choose cross-border partnership. In absence of tax incentives, these
producers would have chosen within-border partnership. This effect is harmless in this
study because it strengthens rather than weakens the previous finding. Remember that
Table 3 documents a productivity premium of firms in within-border partnership serving
both domestic and overseas markets relative to those undertaking cross-border partner-
ship. In effect, the ad-valorem tax favors reduce this estimated productivity premium,
such that the real premium is larger than estimated.
Unlike ad-valorem tax favors, lump-sum tax favors may affect the empirical re-
sults through contaminating TFP. TFP is the output not explained by inputs used in
production, and tax payment is not an input of production; thus, reduced tax payment
may present itself as an increase in TFP. To address this, the regression is rerun with
tax payment included as shown in column (4) of Table 3. Notably, the coefficients of HS
and HHB are very close to those in columns (1)–(3), suggesting that the lump-sum tax
favors are not a significant issue. In China, there are export-promotion zones (EPZs)
and free-trade zones (FTZs) where exports are promoted by multiple policy instruments
that are not applicable to the rest of China, such as lower taxes, eliminated quotas, or
bureaucratic requirements.4 Firms are accordingly divided into two subsamples ac-
cording to whether a firm is inside a four-digit administrative division with a EPZ/FTZ.
Columns (5) and (6) replicate column (4) using the two subsamples and show the same
4 Four-digit level administractive division in China refers to prefecture-level cities. A perfecture is typically
an urban center with surrounding rural areas that are much larger than the urban center.
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findings. The coefficients of HS and HHB are slightly different from those in other
columns, indicating that FTZs and EPZs may have different industry composition from
other regions.
Second, I determine whether the results are affected by industry composition. Cer-
tain partnership types may be concentrated in an industry for some reason, and thus the
results in Table 3 are possibly driven by industry composition. To address this, columns
(1)–(6) all include industry effects, either fixed or random. In addition, I specifically
look into two industries, apparel and electronics, which have the largest trade surplus
in all industries and are meanwhile of opposite levels of sophistication. Columns (7)–
(8) present the regressions respectively using the two subsamples, the results of which
point to the same conclusion as those in columns (1)–(6).
Third, I address whether the results are affected by outliers. Table 4 reports the re-
sults from quantile regressions with similar specifications as in Table 3, which show that
the results in Table 3 are robust with respect to extreme values. In addition, I calculated
the differences between the coefficients of the two dummy variables, and found that the
productivity premium of partnership (HH,B) relative to partnership HS becomes larger
at higher quantiles, suggesting that the productivity distribution is skewed to the right.
In other words, the larger is the productivity dispersion, the more firms with high pro-
ductivity fall in partnership (HH,B), supporting the assumption of Pareto-distributed
productivity discussed earlier.
Fourth, I evaluate whether the results are specific to the parametric estimation
approach. Least-squares regression and quantile regression fit linear conditional mean
expectation and conditional quantile expectation, respectively. Notice that the founda-
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tion of Proposition 2, Proposition 1, argues that the productivity ranking among the
three partnership types holds in terms of distribution rather than expectation. A non-
parametric test on Proposition 2 will be discussed later, together with a nonparametric
test of Proposition 4(iv).
Fifth, I investigate whether the estimated ranking of productivity indeed reflects
the ranking of ex-ante productivity. Tables 3 and 4 establish productivity differences
between the three partnership types, but cannot pinpoint the ultimate sources of the
differences. Recall that the theoretical model centers on ex-ante productivity. Ex-ante
productivity is not directly estimable, which means that the estimated productivity dif-
ferences may not result from differences in ex-ante productivity but other differences
between the three partnership types. For instance, cross-border partnership produces
intermediates, whereas within-border partnership produces final goods; in that case,
measured productivity is not comparable among partnership types.
To address this concern, I examine the firms that engage in cross-border partner-
ship and serve only the Chinese market (i.e., (HH,NON) in the model) in year t. They
have three options in year t+1: stay under the same partnership, switch to cross-border
partnership (i.e., HS in the model) or switch to within-border partnership serving both
Chinese and overseas markets (i.e., (HH,B) in the model). Their production activities,
even if not comparable after switching (year t+1), were comparable before the switching
(year t), because they were then undertaking the same production activity under the
same partnership. In terms of the theory, in an ideal setting, researchers study firms on
date 1 (interaction and contracting). In practice, however, date 1 finishes quickly and
date 2 (production) immediately follows, such that what statistical agencies observe is
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only date 2. This study’s approach is to examine the change in partnership type between
one date 2 and another date 2. Specifically, if a firm in partnership type (HH,NON) in
year t switches to partnership HS or (HH,B) in year t+1, there must be a new date
1 (another interaction and contracting) that takes place between the two consecutive
years. Date 1 is not documented in the data, but it is reflected in the production activity
of year t+1.
Formally, each observation (a firm-year pair) under partnership (HH,NON) is as-
signed two dummy variables:
PRE-HSdt =

1, if HSdt+1 = 1,
0, otherwise,
and
PRE-HHBdt =

1, if HHBdt+1 = 1,
0, otherwise,
and TFP is regressed on PRE-HS and PRE-HHB along with control variables:
lnTFPd jrt = τ+χ1PRE-HSdt+χ2PRE-HHBdt+ ι′Cdrt+% j+ρt+²d jrt. (2.2)
The reference group is now firms that remain under partnership (HH,NON) in year
t+1. Then, χ̂2 > χ̂1 > 0 if the difference in ex-ante productivity is present.
Table 5 establishes the effect of ex-ante productivity. First, switchers were on av-
erage more productive than non-switchers before switching; second, firms that eventu-
ally switched to (HH,B) were on average more productive than those that eventually
switched to HS (the difference is statistically significant at 1% level). Notably, the av-
erage productivity difference between HS and (HH,NON) in Table 5 is approximately
one fourth of that in Table 3, and the average productivity difference between (HH,B)
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and HS in Table 5 is about half of that in Table 3. That is, as expected, ex-ante pro-
ductivity explains only part of the differences in measured productivity among the three
partnership types.
2.4 Prevalence of exporters across partnership types
Proposition 3 says that the share of exporters in partnershipHS relative to (HH,B)
rises if technology transfer becomes more effective (γ increases), coordination difficulty
lowers (µ increases), or dispersion of productivity diminishes (ζ increases). γ and ζ are
industrial characteristics. Technology complexity measured by R&D intensity reduces
the effectiveness of technology transfer.5 A dummy variable HITECH is constructed to
proxy for γ, which equals 1 if a given firm is from a high-technology industry and 0 oth-
erwise.6 ζ reflects the productivity similarity among firms within an industry, from all
firms being almost identical to all firms ranked clearly as a spectrum, and it is inversely
measured by the standard deviation of TFP, denoted by DISP.
Unlike γ and ζ, µ is primarily affected by local infrastructures and institutions.
Coordination would not be an issue if the host country had infrastructures and insti-
tutions identical to those in the source country. High-quality local infrastructures fa-
cilitate cross-border coordination between Chinese producers and their source-country
headquarters. Meanwhile, good local institutions, including the protection of intellec-
5 Using R&D intensity as a measure of technology complexity follows the literature; e.g., Carluccio and
Fally (2008), and Keller and Yeaple (2010).
6 The “classification of manufacturing industries based on technology” published in OECD Science, Tech-
nology and Industry Scoreboard 2005 (p.182) is used to distinguish high-technology industries from low-
technology ones. High-technology industries in the text refer to high- and medium-high technology indus-
tries in the classification, which include (1) aircraft and spacecraft; (2) chemicals, including pharmaceuticals;
(3) office, accounting and computing machinery; (4) radio, TV, and communications equipment; (5) medical,
precision, and optical instruments; (6) electronic machinery and apparatus; (7) motor vehicles, trailers, and
semi-trailers; (8) railroad equipment and transport equipment; and (9) machinery and equipment, n.e.c.
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tual properties and availability of legal and accounting services, are also important in
providing a business-friendly environment for cross-border partnership.
This study uses the marketization index published by the National Economic
Research Institute of the China Reform Foundation as a proxy for local infrasti-
tutions across regions in China. Compiled for each province, this index, denoted by
LOCAL, quantitatively evaluates (1) the relationship between local government and
market (e.g., tax burden and local government size), (2) the development of the local
private sector (e.g., its size relative to other sectors), (3) the efficiency of local product
markets (e.g., protectionism in favor of local firms), (4) the efficiency of local factor mar-
kets (e.g., financial service and labor mobility), and (5) the local legal environment and
the availability of market intermediaries (e.g., intellectual property-protection, as well
as the number of accountants and lawyers in the population).7
The data are then aggregated to the industry-province-year level, and Proposition
3 is tested with the regression:(
σHS
σHH,B
)
jrt
=ϕ0+ϕ1HITECH j+ϕ2DISP jt+ϕ3LOCALrt+ϑ′M jrt+u jrt, (2.3)
where σHS/σHH,B is the number ratio of exporters in cross-border partnership relative
to within-border partnership, and M jrt is a set of industry- and province-level character-
istics in year t. Now j refers to a two-digit industry because HITECH is only available
at the two-digit level; furthermore, the dependent variable has much fewer zeros at
the two-digit level than at the four-digit level. A possible concern is that σHS/σHH,B is
contaminated by industry composition. For instance, some industries are more labor-
7 The Marketization Index Report 2006 reports cross-province marketization indices for years 2001-
2005, while the ASIP data cover the years 2000-2003, so I use the data for the overlapping years 2001-2003
for this analysis.
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intensive than others; meanwhile, labor-intensive production tends to be located in
China by developed-country headquarters because of low labor costs in China. To ad-
dress this, capital intensity is included as a control variable. Provincial population is
included as well to prevent σHS/σHH,B from being driven by the size of local economy.
The regression results are reported in Table 6. Column (1) uses the full sample and
presents the OLS estimates, which are consistent with the theoretical prediction: ϕ̂1 < 0,
ϕ̂2 < 0, ϕ̂3 > 0.8 All observations with zero-value dependent variables are dropped from
the sample in column (2), and Tobit estimation is used instead in column (3), both of
which point to the same findings. Lastly, the dependent variable has three dimensions:
industry, province and year; therefore, there are potential province-industry autocor-
relation within a year, province-year correlation within an industry, and industry-year
correlation within a province. In column (4), OLS is used with the three-way clustering
proposed by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008), which simultaneously controls for
clustering in all three dimensions. Column (4) shows that the findings from columns
(1)–(3) still hold.
2.5 Organizational form
Proposition 4 predicts that in cross-border partnership, producers at arm’s length
have lower ex-ante productivity than those in vertical integration. Using samples of
firms under partnership HS, Table 7 regresses TFP on a dummy variable that equals 1
for vertical integration, and shows that vertical integration is associated with a higher
8 It should be noted that DISP is the disperson of ex-post productivity rather than that of ex-ante produc-
tivity. This is not a significant concern for the following reason. g= (γθ)µ, or ln g= µ lnγ+µ lnθ. Notice that γ
and µ are included in the regression; what ϕ̂2 captures is the effect of ex-ante productivity.
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average productivity than arm’s length. Column (1) includes no control variables, while
column (2) includes profit margin, capital intensity, and regional population with the
same rationale as in column (2) of Table 3. Both columns (1) and (2) use fixed ef-
fects while column (3) uses random effects. Columns (4)–(6) consider tax payments and
EPZ/FTZ as their counterparts in Table 3. In columns (7)–(8), the regression is rerun
with the subsamples of firms in apparel and electronics. All these specifications lead to
the same finding.
Similar to Table 3, Table 7 may capture differences between organizational forms
other than ex-ante productivity. For example, the estimated productivity differences
could result from technology transfer between organizational forms rather than ex-ante
productivity. It should be noted that my theoretical model does predict more effective
technology transfer in vertical integration than at arm’s length; however, this effect
ultimately works through the influence of ex-ante productivity. Also, the estimated pro-
ductivity difference in Table 7 may also result from the heterogeneity in source-country
headquarters.
To address the above concerns, Table 8 follows a similar specification as Table 5,
which focuses on the firms that were in partnership (HS,O) in year t but switched to
partnership (HS, I) in year t+1; in the latter case, the dummy variable PRE-I equals
1. The results show that the firms that eventually switched to partnership (HS, I) were
on average more productive than nonswitchers before integration, which cannot be ex-
plained by the differences in technology transfer or source-country headquarters. This
lends strong support to the effect of ex-ante productivity on the choice of organizational
form. Quantitatively, ex-ante productivity explains about 70% of the productivity pre-
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mium of vertical integration relative to arm’s length.9
2.6 Nonparametric results
Proposition 1 rationalizes the relationship between ex-ante productivity and part-
nership type, and Proposition 2 provides a simple version of Proposition 1 that is easy to
test parametrically. Similarly, Proposition 4(iii) demonstrates the relationship between
ex-ante productivity and organizational form, and Proposition 4(iv) provides a simple
version for parametrical testing. It should be noted that Propositions 1 and 4(iii) hold
for any productivity level across the spectrum rather than only in terms of parameters
(e.g., mean and median). In order to test these propositions without resorting to parame-
ters, a relative distribution function is employed in Figure 5 to compare the distribution
of productivity across partnership types and organizational forms.
2.7 Conclusions and policy implication
This section concludes Chapters 1 and 2 and discusses policy implication of this
study. This study provides a theory of the interaction between headquarters and pro-
ducers in a world of globalized production. Specifically, it addresses what types of for-
eign producers are serving developed countries. There are two types of these foreign
producers. The first type has mid-range productivity and works with developed-country
headquarters, while the second type has high productivity and partners with local head-
quarters. The former does not serve its local market, while the latter serves both local
and developed-country markets.
9 The coefficients of PRE-I in Table 8 are not as significant as 1% because of the small number of switchers
in the data (58 out of 7358), so caution is needed in interpretating their magnitudes.
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The theory also predicts that cross-border partnership is more prevalent in the in-
dustries with more transferable technologies and less heterogeneous producers, as well
as in the regions with higher quality infrastructures and institutions, and that in cross-
border partnership, foreign-country producers with relatively high productivity are ver-
tically integrated with their headquarters, while those with relatively low productivity
operate at arm’s length with their headquarters. These predictions are supported by
firm-level evidence from China.
There are at least two important directions for future research. The first is to
examine the dynamic aspects of the model. For instance, an advanced technology in
the developed country, once transferred to a foreign producer, may carry over to that
producer’s future partnership with its local headquarter. This provides the foreign pro-
ducer and the developed-country headquarter incentive and disincentive, respectively,
to undertake cross-border partnership. The second is to consider general-equilibrium
effects in the model. For instance, technology transfer may drive up factor prices in the
foreign country, which forces the least productive foreign producers to exit; therefore,
the foreign country gains from improved aggregate productivity.
The direct policy implication is on the quality problem of outsourcing products.
It is often reported that products made in developing countries and sold in developed
countries have low quality.10 My study suggests the importance of investigating the
partnership under which low-quality products are made. Specifically, my study could
partially explain the quality problems associated with cross-border production. Sup-
pose that quality and productivity are positively correlated; that is, low-productivity
10 For instance, The Economist, “Poorly Made,” May 14th 2009.
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producers make low-quality products. The findings of this study indicate that medium-
productivity producers in China work with the US multinationals. So, they supply
medium-quality products to the US. Their medium quality, by the US standard, is some-
times low quality. In that case, incentives should be given to high-productivity producers
in developing countries such that they supply high-quality products to the US. By the
US standard, their products may have just medium quality, but still better than low
quality products.
Chapter 3
The Choice of Technology
3.1 Introduction
In developing economies, there is an increasing number of subsidiaries built by
multinational corporations (MNCs) from both developed and emerging economies. It
remains unclear whether productivity of factors in multinational subsidiaries varies by
parent location. On the one hand, skilled labor in developed-economy subsidiaries is
likely to be more productive because innovations in developed economies favor skilled
labor;1 on the other hand, adopting skilled-biased technologies is more costly in unskill-
abundant developing economies, which makes these technologies less attractive.2
The foreign-direct-investment (FDI) inflow of China is the largest in the developing
world, second only to the U.S. worldwide. Using firm-level data from the Chinese elec-
tronics industry, this chapter finds that the productivity of skilled labor in developed-
economy subsidiaries is significantly higher than that in the emerging-economy sub-
sidiaries, whereas the productivity of unskilled labor does not vary by parent loca-
tion. We interpret this as a result of the skill-biased technological change in developed-
economy technologies; it is too costly for MNCs to innovate unskill-biased technologies
1 Innovations are predominantly carried out in developed economies. The G-7 countries account for more
than 90% of the world’s R&D spending (Keller, 2001).
2 See Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2005) and Voilante (2007) for literature reviews.
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to customize their production facilities in developing economies.
This study makes three contributions. First, it addresses whether skill bias of tech-
nologies is inherent in developed-country technologies. To date, the reason for this skill
bias remains unclear. There are two primary explanations: (1) technological change
is inherently skill biased (see, e.g., Autor, Katz, and Krueger (1998), Greenwood and
Yorukoglu (1997), and Griliches (1969)), and (2) skilled bias is caused by the change
in economic fundamentals of OECD countries such as increasing supply of skilled la-
bor.3 This study suggests that skill bias is more significant as an inherent feature of
developed-country technologies, because otherwise unskilled labor would show a higher
productivity in developed-country subsidiaries in respond to local unskilled labor abun-
dance.
Second, this study explains why there exists mismatch between developed-country
technologies and developing-country labor forces. Anecdotal evidence shows that mis-
match is significant; for instance,4
[i]n a recent survey, 600 chief executives of multinational companies
with businesses across Asia said a shortage of qualified staff ranked as
their biggest concern in China and South-East Asia...Across almost every
industry and sector it was the same.
My study suggests that the skill bias in developed-country technologies is inherent and
therefore the mismatch is unavoidable. This rationalizes the fact that developed-country
MNCs move skill-demanding production to unskill-abundant Asia.
3 See, e.g., Acemoglu (1998, 2002) and Kiley (1999)
4 See The Economist, 08/16/2007. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001) provide indirect evidence of this mis-
match with a cross-country empirical study.
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Finally, this study points to where technical spillovers through foreign direct in-
vestment (FDI) might be found. FDI spillovers measured by total factor productivity
(TFP) are found in developped countries (e.g., Keller and Yeaple, 2009; Haskel, Pereira,
and Slaughter, 2007), but whether it exists in developing countries is unclear (Aitken
and Harrison, 1999; Haddad and Harrison, 1993). My study implies that future studies
should look into the productivity of skilled labor for the effect of FDI spillovers.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 discusses empirical specification, data
set, and identification strategies. Section 3.3 presents our main results, and Section 3.4
concludes.
3.2 Specification and data
My specification is a micro-level variant of Caselli and Coleman (2006), which is in-
novative in that the absolute productivity of each type of labor can be directly examined.
Consider a function with constant elasticity of substitution
Y =Kα[(AuLu)σ+ (AsLs)σ](1−α)/σ, (3.1)
where Y is value-added, K is capital proxied by fixed assets, Lu (Ls) is the employment
of unskilled (skilled) labor and Au (As) is its productivity. The elasticity of substitution
between skilled and unskilled labor is 1/(1−σ). α and σ are assumed to be the same
across countries, while Au and As are hypothesized to vary across countries, namely
developed and emerging economies in this context.5 In brief, the purpose of this study
is to back out As, Au, and As/Au, and compare them across multinational subsidiaries
5 This follows the practice in the literature on skill-biased technical change; see Caselli and Coleman (2006,
footnote 9, p.502).
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from different parent sources. Wage share of labor can proxy for (1−α). I need to pinpoint
σ and then use the variation in the data on Ls and Lu to obtain the variation in As and
Au.
To determine σ, I employ the following procedure. The first-order condition implies
that
Ws
Wu
= ( As
Au
)σ(
Ls
Lu
)σ−1, (3.2)
or
ln
Ls
Lu
= σ
1−σ ln
As
Au
− 1
1−σ ln
Ws
Wu
. (3.3)
I construct a dummy variable DE, which equals 1 if a given subsidiary is from developed
economies, and 0 if from emerging economies. In a regression of lnLs/Lu on DE and
ln(Ws/Wu), (
ln
Ls
Lu
)
f c
=φ+β ·DE f −γ
(
ln
Ws
Wu
)
c
+ζ′Zc+² f c, (3.4)
γ̂ estimates the 1/(1−σ) in equation (3.3) and thus allows backing out σ. f and c are firm
and city indices, respectively. Zc is a vector of other city characteristics. The endogeneity
of ln(Ws/Wu) is not a significant concern for two reasons: first, multinational subsidiaries
account for less than 10% of the total number of firms in this study, and thus it is unlikely
that they drive the equilibrium wages in local labor markets; second, city-level wages
have been lagged by one year.
With the obtained σ, I separately impute As, f and Au, f , namely firm-level produc-
tivity of skilled and unskilled labor. The simultaneous system of equations (1) and (2)
generates analytical solutions for Au and As:
Au = Y
1/(1−α)K−α/(1−α)
Lu
(
WuLu
WuLu+WsLs
)1/σ (3.5)
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and
As = Y
1/(1−α)K−α/(1−α)
Ls
(
WsLs
WuLu+WsLs
)1/σ. (3.6)
As, f and Au, f are imputed by inserting firm-level data {Y ,K ,Lu,Ls} f and city-level data
{Wu,Ws}c into equations (3.5)–(3.6). Finally, I regress A f = {As,Au,As/Au} f on DE to
examine the difference in technology across parent sources. Fixed effect at the four-digit
industry level is also included in the regression. Formally,
lnA f i =µ+δA ·DE f +λ′AX f +νi+² f i, (3.7)
where µ is the constant term, X represents firm-level control variables, and δ is the
parameter of interest. i is the four-digit industry index, and νi is the industry-level
fixed effect.
The firm-level data are from the economic survey of 2004 compiled by the National
Bureau of Statistics of China. The survey reports whether a firm’s owner is from emerg-
ing economies (Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macau) or “other foreign economies.” In China,
nearly 90% of the latter are from developed economies. The city-level wage data are cal-
culated based on the Investment Climate Survey (ICS) compiled by the World Bank in
2003. This study extracts, from the economic survey, multinational subsidiaries that are
domiciled in the surveyed cities of the ICS 2003. Therefore, only the firms in surveyed
cities are considered and the sample size is reduced.
Following the standard practice in the literature (e.g., Autor et al., 1998; Katz and
Murphy, 1992), workers with junior college diploma and above are considered as skilled
labor, and the rest as unskilled labor. I focus on the electronics industry for two reasons.
First, it is a typical industry in which FDI is important. Second, in the electronics
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industry, the production located in an unskill-abundant economy such as China is very
homogeneous. According to the “Electronics Industry Yearbook of China,” in 2003, 90%
of electronics exports from China were in the form of assembling and processing.
3.3 Results
As shown in Table 9, 1/(1−σ) is estimated to be 1.42, almost equal to the empirical
value of 1.40 in the literature (e.g., Katz and Murphy, 1992; Caselli and Coleman, 2006).
I then impute As and Au as detailed in the previous section and run regressions (3.7)
with and without control variables. The regression results are reported in Table 10.
Columns (1)–(2) in Table 10 suggest that As is higher in developed-economy subsidiaries
than in emerging-economy subsidiaries, while columns (3)–(4) show that Au has no such
difference. As expected, columns (5)–(6) illustrate the higher relative productivity of
skilled labor in developed-economy subsidiaries. These findings point to the fact that
the innovations in developed economies favor skilled labor. It is more costly for the
MNCs of developed economies to innovate unskill-biased technologies and customize
their production facilities located in developing economies than directly use their skill-
biased technologies there.
The identification comes from the fact that subsidiaries from different parent sources
employ different amounts of skilled labor relative to unskilled labor even though they
face the same prices of local factors. This idea is illustrated by Figure 6, in which the
wage share of skilled labor in payroll is larger in developed-economy subsidiaries than
in emerging-economy subsidiaries. Each circle in the graph is linked to a four-digit in-
dustry in electronics manufacturing, and all the circles are weighted by size (the total
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value-added of multinational subsidiaries). Neither adding weights to the regressions
nor excluding the large industries changes the findings. Clearly, there are substantially
more data points below the 45-degree line than above it.
There are three possible concerns at this point. The first is that subsidiaries from
different parent sources may produce different products, so these subsidiaries are not
comparable. This is unlikely for several reasons: (i) as mentioned earlier, the production
activities located in China by MNCs are very homogeneous in electronics manufactur-
ing; (ii) all the regressions have controlled for four-digit industry fixed effects; (iii) a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test further confirms the similarity in the distribution of four-digit
industries of subsidiaries across parent sources. The combined K-S statistic is 0.063
with p-value 0.44. The hypothesis of the equality of the two distributions cannot be
rejected at any conventional significance level.
The second concern is that workers with different qualities may sort into sub-
sidiaries from different sources. If this were true, unskilled labor would have also
sorted, but the productivity of unskilled labor shows no difference across parent sources.
It is possible that only skilled labor sorts or that the sorting of skilled labor is rela-
tively stronger than that of unskilled labor; however, this is consistent with, rather than
counter to, the argument that the technologies used in developed-economy subsidiaries
favor skilled labor.
The third concern is the sensitivity of the results to different parameterization
and functional forms. I have performed robustness checks using other values of σ, as
well as a production function that takes the complementarity between skilled labor and
capital into account. Autor et al. (1998) conclude that 1/(1−σ) is very unlikely to fall
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outside [1,2]. See also Caselli and Coleman (2006). I experimented with various values
within [1,2] and arrived at the same finding. The alternative functional form I use is
y = {(AuLu)σ+ [(AsLs)ρ + (Akk)ρ]σ/ρ}1/σ. To my knowledge, there is no empirical value
of ρ in the context of multinational subsidiaries located in China. I use the estimate
from the U.S. firms: ρ =−0.5. See Krusell et al. (2000). The conclusion drawn from the
original specifications still holds.
3.4 Conclusion
The technologies used by multinational subsidiaries located in a developing coun-
try are determined by the technologies used in their parent companies, as well as the
local adoption costs associated with these technologies. I find that the productivity of
skilled labor is higher in developed-economy subsidiaries than in emerging-economy
ones, whereas the productivity of unskilled labor does not vary between the two. This
constitutes strong evidence supporting the adoption of skill-biased technologies by multi-
national subsidiaries from developed economies despite the high adoption costs thereof.
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Appendix A
Derivations and Proofs
A.1 Derivation of profit functions
Under partnership (HH,NON), pH = ( ΦHyHH,NON )
1−α, so RHH,NON = pH yHH,NON =
Φ1−αH y
α
HH,NON = Φ1−αHH (θxHH,NON)α. The profit is RHH,NON − cxHH,NON , the first order
condition of which shows xHH,NON = αRHH,NONc . Plugging xHH,NON back to RHH,NON
=Φ1−αH (θxHH,NON)α, I get RHH,NON =ΦHθ
α
1−α (αc )
α
1−α . The profit function is
RHH,NON − cxHH,NON
=RHH,NON − c
αRHH,NON
c
= (1−α)RHH,NON
= (1−α)ΦHθ
α
1−α (
α
c
)
α
1−α ≡ΨΦHΘ.
The case of partnership SS is similar.
Under partnershipHS, pS = ( ΦSyHS )
1−α, so RHS = pS yHS =Φ1−αS yαHS =Φ1−αS (γµθµxHS)α.
The profit is RHS− cxHS, the first order condition of which shows xHS = αRHSc . Plugging
xHS back to RHS =Φ1−αS (γµθµxHS)α, I get RHS =ΦSγ
αµ
1−αθ
αµ
1−α (αc )
α
1−α . The profit function
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is
RHS− cxHS
=RHS− c
αRHS
c
= (1−α)RHS
= (1−α)ΦSγ
αµ
1−αθ
αµ
1−α (
α
c
)
α
1−α ≡ΨΦSΓΘµ.
Under partnership (HH,B), pH = ( ΦHyHH,B,H )
1−α, pS = ( ΦSyHH,B,S )
1−α, then
RHH,B =RHH,B,H +RHH,B,S = pH yHH,B,H + pS yHH,B,S
=Φ1−αH (θxHH,B,H)α+Φ1−αS (θxHH,B,S)α.
The profit is RHH,B−cxHH,B,H−cxHH,B,S, the first order condition of which shows xHH,B,H =
αRHH,B,H
c , xHH,B,S =
αRHH,B,S
c .
Plugging xHH,B,H and xHH,B,S back to RHH,B,H =Φ1−αH (θxHH,B,H)α and RHH,B,S =
Φ1−αS (θxHH,B,S)
α, respectively, I get RHH,B,H = ΦHθ
α
1−α (αc )
α
1−α , RHH,B,S = ΦSθ
α
1−α (αc )
α
1−α .
The profit function is
RHH,B− cxHH,B,H − cxHH,B,S− fEX
=RHH,B,H +RHH,B,S− c
αRHH,B,H
c
− cαRHH,B,S
c
− fEX
= (1−α)RHH,B,H + (1−α)RHH,B,S− fEX
= (1−α)(ΦH +ΦS)θ
α
1−α (
α
c
)
α
1−α − fEX
≡Ψ(ΦH +ΦS)Θ− fEX .
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A.2 The proof of Lemma 1
Define
Λ(Θ)≡piHS(Θ)−piHH(Θ)− p˜i
=ΨΦSΓΘµ−ΨΦHΘ−Ψ˜ΦSΘ˜.
By condition (1.10),
Γ> ΨΦHΘ∗+Ψ˜ΦSΘ˜
ΨΦSΘ
µ
∗
,
so Λ(Θ∗) > 0. If Θ is sufficiently large, so Λ(Θ) < 0; if Θ→ 0, Λ(Θ) < 0 so there exist
two values respectively (0,Θ∗) and (Θ∗,∞) at which Λ(Θ) = 0. Denote them by Θ and
Θ, respectively. Then, any Θ ∈ (Θ,Θ) satisfies piHS(Θ)−piHH(Θ)− p˜i> 0 (part (ii) proved).
QED.
A.3 The proof of Lemma 2
The “if” part is obvious, as condition (1.12) is stricter than condition (1.11). The
“only if” part is equivalent to this claim: if Θ ∉ (Θ,Θ), condition (1.11) fails. The proof is
as follows. Define Θ∗ such that piHS(Θ∗)− p˜i= 0.
Case 1: Θ ∈ (0,Θ∗]. Since dpiHS(Θ)/dΘ > 0 for any Θ ∈ R++, piHS(Θ∗)− p˜i < 0, so
piHS(Θ)−pi
XH
HH(Θ)− p˜i< 0.
Case 2: Θ ∈ (Θ∗,Θ]. By Lemma 1, piHS(Θ)−piHH,NON(Θ)−p˜i< 0; however, piHS(Θ)−
pi
XH
HH,NON(Θ)− p˜i can be positive if pi
XH
HH(Θ)< piHH(Θ). If piHS(Θ)−pi
XH
HH,NON(Θ)− p˜i> 0, it
is profitable for ZS to choose XH instead of XS. To get XH , ZS can offer XH any profit
transfer TZS (Θ) ∈ [0,piHS(Θ)−p˜i); but, ZH will bid up any TZS (Θ) by TZH (Θ)=TZS (Θ)+ε,
where ε is a slightly positive value, because piZH (Θ) = piHH,NON(Θ)− (piHS(Θ)− p˜i+ ε) =
57
−(piHS(Θ)−piHH,NON(Θ)−p˜i)−ε> 0; then, ZS will further bid up by TZH (Θ)+ε′ in return.
The only equilibrium is when ZH offers TZH (Θ) = piHS(Θ)− p˜i, ZH has no incentive to
change because its reservation profit is zero, and ZS has no incentive to bid up further.
That is, piXH (Θ)=piHS(Θ)− p˜i, so piHS(Θ)−pi
XH
HH,NON(Θ)− p˜i=piHS(Θ)−piHS(Θ)+ p˜i− p˜i= 0.
Case 3: Θ ∈ [Θ,∞). Similar to Case 2, the only equilibrium is when ZH offers
TZH (Θ)=piHS(Θ)− p˜i. That is, piXH (Θ)=piHS(Θ)− p˜i, so piHS(Θ)−pi
XH
HH,B(Θ)− p˜i=piHS(Θ)−
piHS(Θ)+ p˜i− p˜i= 0. QED.
A.4 The proof of Proposition 3
Notice that σHS/σHH,B = [V (Θ)−V (Θ)]/[1−V (Θ)].
Parts (i) and (ii). The goal is to show dΘdγ > 0, dΘdµ > 0,
dΘ
dγ < 0, and
dΘ
dµ < 0.
At Θ, define Ξ=piHS(Θ)−piHH,B(Θ)−pi= 0. By implicit function theorem,
dΘ
dγ
=−
dΞ
dγ
dΞ
dΘ
=−
dpiHS(Θ)
dγ
dpiHS(Θ)
dΘ
− dpiHH,B(Θ)
dΘ
,
dΘ
dµ
=−
dΞ
dµ
dΞ
dΘ
=−
dpiHS(Θ)
dµ
dpiHS(Θ)
dΘ
− dpiHH,B(Θ)
dΘ
.
Note thatdpiHS(Θ)
dΘ
− dpiHS,B(Θ)
dΘ
< 0, dpiHS(Θ)dγ > 0, and
dpiHS(Θ)
dµ > 0, so dΘdγ > 0, dΘdµ > 0.
At Θ, define Ξ′ =piHS(Θ)−piHH,NON(Θ)−pi= 0. Then,
dΘ
dγ
=−
dΞ′
dγ
dΞ′
dΘ
=−
dpiHS (Θ)
dγ
dpiHS(Θ)
dΘ −
dpiHH,NON (Θ)
dΘ
,
dΘ
dµ
=−
dΞ′
dµ
dΞ′
dΘ
=−
dpiHS(Θ)
dµ
dpiHS(Θ)
dΘ −
dpiHH,NON (Θ)
dΘ
.
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Note thatdpiHS(Θ)dΘ −
dpiHH,NON (Θ)
dΘ > 0,
dpiHS(Θ)
dγ > 0, and
dpiHS(Θ)
dµ > 0, so
dΘ
dγ < 0, and
dΘ
dµ < 0.
Part (iii). σHS = 1−
(
Θ/Θ
)ζ
, Θ<Θ, so dσHSdζ > 0. Similarly,
dσHH,B
dζ < 0. QED.
Appendix B
Data Details and Supplementary Results
B.1 Details on the data
The primary data source is the Annual Surveys of Industrial Production from 2000
through 2003 conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics of China. These survey
data are proprietary.
Each firm in the survey has an ID number. There are about 10 duplicate IDs in
each year, and I dropped these observations. The dataset for the years 2000-2004 has
162,869, 169,017, 181,545, and 196,206 observations, respectively. Then, data for all
years are merged by ID number. Further data cleaning takes three steps. First, firms
outside manufacturing industries (four-digit industry code <1311 or >4392) are dropped,
which reduces the sample size by 60,415. Second, firms that are not in normal operation
(i.e., status code does not equal 1) are dropped, which reduces the sample size by 16,141.
Third, observations with wrong industry and area codes are also dropped, which reduces
the sample size by about 140.
My study focuses on domestically owned firms (registration type code <200) that
export some or all of their outputs, and foreign-owned firms (registration type codes:
230 and 330) that export all of their outputs. Keeping these firms only, my working
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dataset has 512,832 observations. I then drop the firms that are present only once
in the four-year time span, because their productivity cannot be estimated using the
Levinsohn-Petrin method. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table S1. The within-
border partnership serving the Chinese market only, within-border partnership serving
both markets, cross-border partnership at arm’s length, and cross-border partnership in
vertical integration have 338,532, 64,335, 15,845, and 14,107 observations, respectively.
B.2 Supplementary results
Chapter 2 regresses TFP on either partnership types or organizational forms. This
approach is useful because of its simplicity in estimating productivity differences among
the three partnership types or between the two organizational forms. The alternative
specification, i.e., regressing partnership on TFP, is more intuitive as it suggests how
productivity predicts the choices between partnership types or organizational forms.
Table S2 estimates a multinomial logit model. The dependent variable is partner-
ship type: within-border partnership serving the Chinese market only (0), cross-border
partnership (1), and within-border partnership serving both Chinese and overseas mar-
ket (2). They are respectively linked to partnerships (HH,NON), HS, and (HH,B) in
the text. The reference group is (HH,NON). Columns (1)–(2) show that producers with
higher productivity have a higher probability of choosing partnership HS relative to
(HH,NON), and an even higher probability of choosing partnership (HH,B) relative to
(HH,NON). Control variables are as in the text. Also as in the text, columns (3)–(4)
include tax payment as an additional control variable, and columns (5)–(6) and (7)–(8)
consider the apparel industry and the electronics industry. All columns lead to the same
61
finding.
Table S3 uses the same specification as Table S2 but employs an ordered logit
model. The theoretical model suggests that HS is a better choice for producers that
are qualified for (HH,NON) and have sufficiently high productivity; similarly, (HH,B)
is a better choice for producers that are qualified for HS and have sufficiently high
productivity. Thus, I order the three partnerships as 0, 1, 2, and examine whether
productivity premium in the form of “upgrade probability” is present between the three
partnership types. As expected, productivity has a positive and significant coefficient in
all columns.
Table S4 uses a logit model to examine the choice between organizational forms un-
der cross-border partnership: arm’s length (0) and vertical integration (1). Its structure
is similar to Table 7 and Table S2. Notably, the magnitude of the productivity increase
associated with productivity is smaller in column (4) than in column (3). This is possibly
because productivity heterogeneity becomes less significant in industries with a compar-
ative disadvantage. Specifically, China has a comparative disadvantage in industries
with high sophistication, such as electronics. Therefore, the productivity dispersion of
Chinese electronics firms is smaller than average, and the productivity difference across
organizational forms becomes smaller.
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Appendix C
Tables and Figures
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ln 
(Ls/Lu)0.22**
(0.09)
-1.42***
(0.51)
-0.62
(0.44)
-0.05
(0.10)
5.52
(3.80)
846
(0.00)
0.25
Dependent variable:
Developed-economy dummy
Table 9: Estimation of the Elasticity of Substitution 
Notes: Fixed effect at the four-digit industry level has 
been controlled for. The F-test examines the joint 
significance of all coefficients (H0: all equal 0). 
Coefficients are rounded to their nearest neighbors.        
*, significant at 10%; **, significant at 5%; ***, 
significant at 1%.
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Table S3: Partnership Choice, Ordered Logit Results
Notes: The dependent variable is partnership type: 0 
(HH,NON), 1 (HS), and 2 (HH,B). See text for their 
definitions. Productivity is measured by TFP calculated 
using Levinsohn-Petrin estimates. Control variables are 
profit margin, capital intensity, and regional population.  
Column (1) is the baseline result. Column (2) includes tax 
payments as an additional control variable. Columns (3) 
and (4) use subsamples of firms in two-digit industries 
apparel and electronics, respectively. Constant term is 
suppressed. ***, significant at 1%.
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Productivity 0.306*** 0.309*** 0.340*** 0.143***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.030) (0.025)
Observations 22016 22016 3888 1282
Table S4: Ornigazational Form Choice, Logit Results
Notes: The dependent variable is the organization form of 
cross-border production: 0 (HS,O) and 1 (HS,I). See text for 
their definitions. Productivity is measured by TFP 
calculated using Levinsohn-Petrin estimates. Marginal 
effects are reported. Control variables are profit margin, 
capital intensity, and regional population.  Column (1) is 
the baseline result. Column (2) includes tax payments as an 
additional control variable. Columns (3) and (4) use 
subsamples of firms in two-digit industries apparel and 
electronics, respectively. Constant term is suppressed. ***, 
significant at 1%.
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